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ANIMAL NORMATIVITY
abstract
Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not 
provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two 
deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on 
Hannah Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures 
may have first-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things 
should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying 
some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having 
robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that 
would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
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Human beings are normative creatures. We follow practical norms that give us reasons to act 
in certain ways, social norms that regulate how individuals must act as part of a social group, 
moral norms that guide the morally required behavior or the correct moral judgements, 
etc. We also have a capacity to display robust responsiveness to (and an understanding of) 
norms, as well as a capacity to assess our behavior, and that of others, through a normative 
lens. Based on these facts, Lorini (2018) has characterized humans as “nomic animals”, i.e., 
animals capable of acting in light of norms. Giovani Conte (2000), in turn, introduces the 
term “nomotropism” to refer to this capacity that human agents display to orient themselves 
according to norms.1
There is also a widespread consensus that humans are the only normative animals (Brandom, 
1994; Korsgaard, 2006; McDowell, 1994; Schmidt & Rakoczy, 2019). However, several recent 
dissenting voices have defended that some non-human animals can actively respond to norms 
and even have some understanding of them. Philosophers within this group usually focus on 
moral norms and moral agency (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009; de Waal, 2014; Rowlands, 2012; Rudolf 
von Rohr et al., 2011). Nevertheless, Vincent, Ring & Andrews (2019) and Lorini (2018) have 
suggested a different methodological approach to the problem of animal normativity. They 
urge us to step back from the debate on whether non-human animals follow moral norms to 
focus – at least temporarily— on the broader issue of whether some animals have a general 
capacity to act in light of norms. Following their lead, in this paper I will focus on examining 
and comparing two deflated accounts of normativity that might be better suited to be 
extended to non-human animals than other orthodox accounts. 
This is the structure of the paper: I will begin by presenting a highly intellectualist model of 
normativity that I will call the reflexive model. According to it, normative creatures must have 
an explicit grasp of norms as such, as well as a capacity to reflect on whether their actions or 
their motives conform to them (Section 2). This demanding approach does not seem to be 
a good option for those interested in crediting non-linguistic animals with any capacity to 
respond to norms and display normative behaviors. But this is not the only possible way of 
1 Interestingly, the capacity to act in light of norms may include more than being able to act in ways that conform 
to them. It can also include the capacity to guide one’s behavior according to norms even when one is not actually 
following them but, for example, trying to break them without suffering the consequences, circumventing them, etc. 




thinking about such abilities. In Section 3, I will briefly delineate a minimalistic alternative, 
based on the notion of “primitive normativity” (Ginsborg 2011a; 2011b). In addition to this, 
in Section 4, I would like to propose a different deflationary account of normativity, based 
on the notion of “robust ought-thoughts”, showing why it is more demanding than primitive 
normativity but less exigent than the reflective model. This paper’s main aim will be, then, to 
compare and discuss these two deflationary models of what non–linguistic animal normativity 
could consist in: the “primitive normativity model” and the “robust ought-thoughts model”. In 
each case, I will briefly examine the cognitive differences between creatures having primitive 
normativity and those having robust ought-thoughts. Based on them, I will draw a few 
general remarks on the kind of animal behavior that seems to be easily explainable in terms of 
primitive normativity and the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest, instead, that an 
animal has robust ought-thoughts.2Admittedly, a more detailed analysis of relevant empirical 
evidence would be needed to conclude that any of these deflationary models can be fruitfully 
extended to the behavior of non-human species. I will leave such a task for a future occasion. 
My only aim here is to roughly examine and contrast some theoretical alternatives that those 
interested in the problem of animal normativity may end up finding explanatory useful. 
According to a long Kantian tradition, nomic animals do not only act because they have some 
psychological motives to do so. Rather, they can also act in a certain way because the abide 
by a norm. Now, how should such a capacity to act in response to a norm be understood? 
This is how advocates of this model will likely respond: for an agent’s action A to be a case of 
responsiveness to a norm, she must represent the norm, acknowledge its legitimacy, correctly 
infer (or somehow recognize) A as the action prescribed by it and, finally, do A, because it is 
the behavior that the norm prescribes (Okrent, 2018).
Korsgaard (2006) proposes a slightly different version of this account. According to her view, 
normative creatures do not merely act guided by their psychological motives but, rather, they 
are capable of gaining control over their impulses by inspecting them and judging whether 
there are good reasons in their favor. Moreover, such a capacity is what distinguishes humans 
from other animals. In fact, using a term coined by Harry Frankfurt, Korsgaard claims that 
non-human animals are mere “wanton”: they just act on their uppermost instinct, desire or 
emotion. Human animals, on the contrary, have a capacity for normative self-government that 
allows them to adopt a reflexive distance from their motives and ask themselves whether they 
should follow them or not. 
In brief, according to the reflexive model, normative creatures must be capable of: i) explicitly 
thinking about norms as such and ii) taking norms as objects of further thoughts (in order, 
for example, to consider them as legitimate and to assess whether their behavior conforms to 
them or not). Additionally, in Korsgaard version, they must be able to: iii) have second-order 
thoughts about the adequacy of some of their motivational states in light of those norms. 
Then, these creatures must not only be capable of making normative judgements about the 
world or their actions. They must also be capable of making similar judgements about their 
motivational states and the grounds that they have to follow them (or not). 
It seems difficult to extend such a restrictive view of normativity to non-human animals.3 
2 Even though I think that these are general models that one may apply to explain different kinds of nomic behavior 
in non-human animals, my brief discussion of empirical examples will focus on behavior suggesting a capacity to act 
in light of social norms. A more encompassing treatment of these issues should include how these two deflationary 
models could be extended to evidence suggesting responsiveness to other types of norms.
3 Even if one is not interested in the issue of animal normativity, it is possible to find compelling criticisms against 
such models in Kornblith (2012) and Rowlands (2012).




After all, it is highly controversial whether there are non-human animals that have second-
order thoughts or reflective capacities (Bermúdez, 2003; Rowlands & Monsó, 2017), and even 
those philosophers and scientists who think that humans are not the exclusive possessors 
of such capacities are only willing to attribute some of them to a few non-human species. 
However, there are other less demanding conceptions of normativity. The next two sections 
will be dedicated to exploring two deflationary alternatives of this sort. 
Let us turn, then, to the two deflationary models of normativity that I will be interested 
in discussing and comparing. A central notion in the reconstruction of such models is that 
of “implicit norms”. Implicit norms play a key role amongst those interested in defending 
minimalistic accounts of normativity (Andrews, 2014) and attributing at least a basic capacity 
to understand and follow norms to (some) non-linguistic animals (Bekoff & Pierce, 2009). 
However, the notion of implicitness that is associated with norms in these debates can be 
interpreted in several ways. According to one use of the notion, something is implicit when it 
is unarticulated or not verbalized (Brownstein, 2018). Since animals lack language, it is clear 
that, if they have some understanding of norms, it will be implicit in this sense. There are, 
nevertheless, other ways of understanding implicitness that are relevant to our discussion. 
One may think, for example, that those creatures that merely have a non-representational 
capacity to discriminate behaviors conforming to a norm from those deviating from it have an 
implicit understanding of this norm. After all, they lack any explicit representation – whether 
articulated in a public language or mentally represented– of the norm’s content. 
In this vein, Hannah Ginsborg (2011a; 2011b) has coined the notion of “primitive normativity” 
to refer to a kind of normativity that does not depend on conformity to an antecedently 
recognized rule or norm. According to Ginsborg, this basic kind of normativity consists in an 
awareness of the appropriateness of a response to a specific context that does not depend 
on the antecedent grasp of a rule or norm determining that response as correct rather than 
incorrect. The creature endowed with this kind of normativity has a minimal understanding 
of what is appropriate to do, without needing neither to explicitly represent the norm that 
guides her action nor to put it into words.
Ginsborg explicitly attributes this kind of normativity to human infants. She invites us to 
imagine that a child who has not yet mastered color concepts learns, by following the example 
of an adult, how to sort green objects in one pile and blue objects in another pile. It does not 
seem adequate to attribute to this child the capacity to grasp a rule like place all the blue objects 
in one pile and the red objects in another, since, by hypothesis, she lacks at least some key concepts 
– color concepts— that are constitutive components of the rule’s content. However, it would 
not be adequate either to describe her as being merely caused by the blue and red objects to 
sort them in two piles. Rather, it seems that “a normative claim is embedded in her behavior” 
(Brownstein, 2018). The child has learned, by her previous interactions with the adult, how to 
act. She is motivated to act in such a way and she experiences the appropriateness of it. She 
is aware that the blue objects “fit” in one pile while the red objects “fit” in a different one. 
Furthermore, the child would probably become upset if she found out that she had mistakenly 
left a red object in the blue pile and would experience the inappropriateness of her response.
Kristin Andrews and colleagues have given their own twist to the notion of primitive 
normativity in order to extend it to non-human animals (Andrews, 2014; Sultanescu & 
Andrews, 2013; Vincent, Ring & Andrews, 2019). Basically, they add a social dimension to 
Ginsborg’s proposal. In their view, animals that have primitive normativity must be capable 
of distinguishing in-group from out-group members, and they must have a sense of how 
we do things around here that does not depend on grasping and conforming to antecedently 
recognized norms or rules.





One may wonder, at this point, whether we should credit creatures that have this kind of 
primitive normativity with any kind of normative thoughts. Ginsborg herself seems to think 
that these creatures need to be capable of entertaining some thoughts about their actions, with 
contents like this is appropriate, this fits, or this belongs. These contents seem to be part of the 
“sense of appropriateness” that accompanies their actions. Moreover, she claims that to have 
such contents, they must also have “the capacity to entertain a concept of normative fit, which 
we might label as the concept ought or appropriate” (Ginsborg, 2011a, p. 252). 
What follows from Ginsborg’s characterization of primitive normativity, however, is that such 
contents do not represent an explicit general norm. Rather, they only involve the attribution 
of a property like fitting, belonging, etc., to the response that the creature is currently giving 
(like “this is appropriate” or “this fits”). 
It could be argued that, since the creature is conscious of her response being appropriate to a 
context, she also has to represent that context which, as Ginsborg suggests, will occasionally 
include her preceding responses in similar circumstances (cf. Ginsborg 2011a p. 241 and 
p. 244). Now, even if this were the case, the creature endowed with this primitive kind of 
normativity would only have to represent two things: i) how she has acted in the past and ii) 
whether her current responses are appropriate or not (given these past responses). Yet, she 
would not need to have a general and explicit representation of how one should act, or about 
how things ought to be, different from her representations of how things are.4 Arguably, 
then, having primitive normative thoughts requires, at most, only a very limited capacity to 
normatively asses what is happening in the thinker’s “here-and-now”. After all, primitive 
normative contents only need to refer to what their owners are currently doing (or to the 
behaviors that they are observing in others). Creatures having these thoughts may, then, be 
incapable of anticipating what ought to be the case in the future, in a counterfactual situation, 
etc. They do not need such fancier abilities in order to apply their primitive concept of “being 
appropriate” to what they are presently experiencing.5
The notion of primitive normativity may be useful to account for some intriguing examples 
of animal behavior. Still, assessing its explanatory value is a complex task that requires 
establishing what kind of non-linguistic behavior would indicate that an animal has this kind 
of normativity and giving reasons to think that such behavior cannot be better explained 
in non-normative terms. Providing these criteria and reasons exceeds the scope of this 
paper. However, I would like to finish this section by presenting one illustrative example 
of a behavioral pattern that seems, at least initially, to be nicely explained by primitive 
normativity. 
Several primatologists have defended that chimpanzees have proto-social norms regarding the 
treatment of infants. As they report, infants are usually given deferential treatment by adult 
members of chimpanzees’ communities. They are allowed to jump over adults, to steal food 
or tools from them, etc. Moreover, when an adult chimpanzee behaves in an aggressive way 
towards an infant, this usually leads to an uproar of protest by adult females and can even cause 
some third-party intervention (de Waal, 1996; Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2011; 2015). This kind of 
non-verbal evidence is considered to be particularly revealing because it involves the reaction 
4 Besides, as mentioned above, creatures having these contents may lack the appropriate concepts to categorize the 
actions that they sense as appropriate. That is why, one may conjecture, we find demonstrative expressions referring 
to those actions in the linguistic articulation of such contents (e.g., “this fist” or “this belongs”).
5 Similar considerations apply to Andrews and colleagues’ understanding of primitive normativity. Even though they 
give the notion a social twist, creatures with this kind of normative sensitivity only need to have contents referring to 
particular present actions: those that “we” do around here. But they do not need to be capable of thinking about how 
their group ought to behave in counterfactual situations, what they ought to have done in the past, etc. 
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of uninvolved bystanders. Consequently, it can be excluded “that the reactions in question 
are simple responses to the violation of individual interests but rather are based on more 
generalized expectations about ‘how one ought to behave’” (Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2011, p. 3). 
Now, arguably, chimpanzees need not have in mind a general normative content such as 
“one must not hurt infants”, to react as they do. Alternatively, they may have acquired, 
by previous experiences, the disposition to respond to aggression towards infants with an 
awareness of its inappropriateness. Such a primitive sense of what is appropriate or not 
seems sufficient to explain their reactions. Although I will not be able to do so here, I think 
that one may provide similar accounts of other behavioral patterns that animals display 
in social contexts, such as the disposition of some species of non-human primates to break 
fights amongst others, their protests against unequal divisions of goods, etc. (de Waal, 2014). 
Once again, a primitive capacity to be aware of the appropriateness/inappropriateness 
of some particular actions (performed by them or by others) may be all that is needed to 
account for such evidence.
In this section, I will propose an alternative model of responsiveness to norms that is more 
demanding than the one based on primitive normativity, yet less stringent than the reflexive 
model. Let us begin by returning to the explicitness or implicitness of norms. According to a 
widespread way of understanding explicitness, something— a thought, a feeling, a content— is 
explicit when its owner is aware of it (Brownstein, 2018). Furthermore, it is usually claimed 
that such awareness of a thought, a content, etc., requires reflexively turning towards those 
mental entities and transforming them into the objects of second-order thoughts. Extending 
these ideas to norms, the advocates of the reflexive model claim that nomic creatures must 
have mental representations of the norms that they follow (Okrent, 2018), and they must be 
capable of taking such representations of norms as objects of further thoughts in order to 
evaluate whether their actions, or their motivational states, accord with them or not. 
Imagine now, on the contrary, that some creatures lack both the concept of norms and second-
order thoughts about their motivational states. They are neither capable of explicitly thinking 
about their representations of norms as norms, nor of acknowledging them as legitimate or 
illegitimate, assessing whether their motivational states, or their actions, accord with those 
norms, etc. There is a sense in which their understanding of norms, if they have any, must be 
implicit. What I would like to suggest here is that these creatures may still have some explicit 
representations of how one ought to behave in different situations, such as: “one ought not to 
hurt an infant”, “one ought to defend one’s kin”, etc. Moreover, they may also have a practical 
capacity to use such representations to guide their behavior, even if they are not capable of 
explicitly thinking about them as norms. From now onwards, I will refer to those mental states 
that explicitly represent how things ought to be as “robust ought-thoughts”.
Even if they do not involve the capacity to have second-order thoughts, or to reflect about 
norms as such, “robust ought-thoughts” still impose some substantive cognitive requirements. 
In order to think about what ought to be the case, a creature must be capable of representing 
more than what is actually present. In this sense, having ought-thoughts is similar to thinking 
about how things could be, how they will be, or how they were. What all these thoughts have 
in common is that they involve an ability to detach oneself from what is happening in the 
immediate environment. Thus, creatures that have robust ought-thoughts must possess quite 
sophisticated abilities to represent what is not actually the case, but ought to be.6
6 One may find a similar suggestion in Vincent, Ring and Andrews (2019). According to them, an ought-thought: 








To better understand the cognitive capacities involved in having robust ought-thoughts, I will 
focus on the influential account of the evolution of human infants’ representational capacities 
developed by Josep Perner. According to Perner (1991), during the first two years of their lives, 
infants only have one model of reality composed by primary representations whose main 
function is to represent how the world is. By the time they turn two, however, they acquire 
secondary representations “decoupled” from reality— i.e., children do not confuse them with 
their primary representations of how things actually are. Secondary representations allow 
them to entertain multiple offline models with different functions: representing how things 
were in the past, how things will be in the future, how things could be in a counterfactual 
situation, etc. In this sense, they free them to think beyond what they have perceptually 
experienced. Finally, the acquisition of secondary representations enables the emergence 
of a host of abilities, such as the capacity to understand hidden displacements, means-ends 
reasoning, pretense, empathy, some basic capacities to interpret external representations, 
mirror self-recognition, etc. 
Perner thinks, however, that, at this stage, children do not have yet the more sophisticated 
capacity to meta-represent or to represent representations as representations. They 
treat their different models of reality as different kinds of “situations” – past situations, 
future situations, as-if situations, etc., — but they do not explicitly understand them as 
representational models. They will not acquire meta-representational capacities until they are 
three or even four years old.
Suddendorf and Whiten have extrapolated Perner’s distinctions to debates in animal 
cognition, arguing that we have good evidence that great apes have secondary representations 
that allow them to display a range of remarkable skills, similar to those of two-year-old 
infants, in tasks like mirror self-recognition, understanding hidden displacements, pretense, 
empathic behavior, interpreting pictorial representations, etc., (Suddendorf, 1998; Suddendorf 
& Whiten, 2001).7 As Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) admit, we should not expect different 
species of animals to deploy secondary representations exactly in the same realms as humans 
or in the same ways as humans. That being said, I would like to suggest that some animals 
lacking meta-representational skills may still have a specific kind of secondary representations 
allowing them to represent how things ought to be. These “robust ought-thoughts” should be 
understood as explicit first-order representations about non-actual ideal situations. Since they 
are about what is not actually the case, it is possible for the thinkers of such thoughts to use 
them as models or standards of correctness, allowing them to normatively guide their current 
actions by contrasting what they actually do with what they should be doing or how things 
actually are with how they should be. However, if ought-thoughts are to function as normative 
standards, they must have some additional features. Let me roughly present some of them. 
The first thing to point out is that ought-thoughts are supposed to have the same kind of 
general deontic contents that norms have and, presumably, it must be possible to use them, 
just as norms are used, to guide our behavior. But, if this is so, these mental states should 
the case –like thinking about what happened in the past, what might happen in the future, and what might be the 
case under various circumstances— is a cognitive mode that requires the thinker to do more than represent what is 
currently the case” (pp. 58-59). 
Although I find this passage illuminating, it is hard to reconcile it with the notion of primitive normativity that they 
defend. In line with my previous arguments, I do not think that the demanding ought-thoughts that they are referring 
to in this quote are needed for primitive normativity, but I do think that they are required for the more robust type of 
normativity that I sketch in this section. 
7 As Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) remark, there is also some evidence suggesting that other animals,
like dolphins, dogs, parrots and monkeys, may also have secondary representations.
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share at least some key features with norms. One of them is the agent-independent or 
general character of norms (Christen & Glock, 2012; Rakoczy, 2015; Roughley 2019; Schmidt 
& Rakoczy 2019). A norm prescribing that one ought not to hurt children, for example, is 
a general standard that applies to any agent in equivalent circumstances. It can be argued 
that the contents of ought-thoughts will have to be general and agent-independent as well, 
representing not only how the thinker ought to behave, but, also, how others in equivalent 
circumstances must do it. Consequently, thinking such contents will involve having some 
expectations on the behavior of others and, probably, manifesting that these expectations 
are unfulfilled when one finds out that the others do not behave as they ought. All this goes 
well with the idea that one kind of privileged evidence to focus on, when studying animal 
normativity, are behaviors suggesting that animals react in a negative way when some group 
norms are violated (Christen & Glock, 2012; Mertens, 2019; Rudolf von Rohr, et al. 2011; 2015). 
Another key feature of norms is their normative force (Rakoczy, 2015; Rowlands, 2012; Schmidt 
& Rackozy, 2019). Norms exert a “normative grip” on us; they require or demand actions of 
a certain kind in certain contexts (Roughley, 2019). However, at the same time, it is always 
possible to violate them. Once again, to function as action-guiding norms do, ought-thoughts 
should share those features, binding the thinkers to act in a certain way (even though it must 
be also possible for them to act otherwise). Ought-thoughts must, then, motivate their owners 
to act in such a way as to satisfy their contents. In this sense, it can be claimed that, like 
other motivational states, ought-thoughts must have a world-to-mind direction of fit: when 
things are not as they represent them, it is the world the one that should be changed, not the 
thoughts’ contents (Cristhen & Glock 2012; Searle, 2004). 
Finally, some philosophers credit norms with an additional property: they must give agents 
reasons to act in certain ways that are independent of their particular interests and desires 
(Korsgaard, 2006). Arguably, ought-thoughts must also share this feature. Thus, creatures 
that have ought-thoughts should sometimes face a conflict between these thoughts and their 
desires or interests. They must also be capable of acting as their ought-thoughts indicate, even 
when their desires or preferences do not motivate them to do so. They must be capable, for 
example, of acting in a specific way A, despite not having any individual desire or interest to 
do A, just because they think that is what they ought to do; they must be capable of refraining 
from acting as they desire because their ought-thoughts prescribe not to act in such a way, etc. 
If these considerations are correct, having robust ought-thoughts amounts to having 
representations of the content of norms that can be used to guide and evaluate behavior. 
Now, it seems that if ought-thoughts are to guide a creature’s behavior, she must treat them 
as norms. However, treating some contents as norms is not the same as reflexively thinking 
about them as norms. The former is a practical capacity to be guided by how one thinks that 
things ought to be, which requires putting to use two different kinds of first-order thoughts 
(i.e., thoughts about how things are and thoughts about how they should be). But it does not 
require a meta-representational ability to think about our motives as motives and to judge 
whether we should follow them or not. Neither does it require taking our representations 
of norms as objects of second-order thoughts in order to acknowledge them as norms, to 
explicitly judge whether our actions accord with them, etc. In a sense, then, the kind of 
normativity that comes tied to putting to use ought-thoughts is not as demanding as the one 
described by the reflexive model. 
At this point, one may ask: where does the difference lie between creatures having only 
primitive normativity and creatures having robust ought-thoughts? Let me give a rough 
answer to this question. As seen above, creatures that merely have a capacity for “primitive 
normativity” only need to be able to represent some actual responses as “appropriate” or 
“fitting” in light of their previous responses. Thus, they may be only capable of representing 
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what they are currently experiencing or have experienced in the past, and they need only 
be capable of normatively reacting to their representations of how things are right here 
and now. In contrast, creatures that can think robust ought-thoughts must also be capable 
of representing non-actual ideal situations and of using such representations as general 
standards to guide their behavior. 
Now, it seems to me that having such decoupled models or standards makes a host of new 
capacities and responses possible. Let me suggest here just a few examples: 
a) Inventing new normative responses: Having robust ought-thoughts allows a creature to 
imagine or invent different kinds of responses, and to think of them as the responses that 
ought to be given in certain contexts. Afterwards, she may use these representations as 
standards to guide her behavior when actually trying to perform these new actions, or 
when evaluating the performance of others. Imagine, for example, that a kid invents a new 
game and stipulates that several innovative responses constitute different “moves” in that 
game. It seems to me that when, later on, she tries to play the game with others, she will 
need to have (at least) some robust of ought-thoughts representing those actions as the 
“correct moves” and use them to guide her responses, and to evaluate those of others. 
b) Performing complex instrumental actions: It has been argued that to perform complex 
instrumental actions, it is necessary to have: 
i) a goal state representing how things ought to be;
ii) the capacity to mentally manipulate the components of the present situation so that 
they match the goal state and the ability to identify those sequences of actions that 
can take us from the present situation to the ideal one; 
iii) the capacity to enact the identified sequences of actions. 
c) Interpreting external representations as models of how things should be. Creatures with robust 
ought-thoughts should be able to use them to interpret external representations — 
pictures, maps, scale models, etc., — not as representations of how things are, but as 
representations of how they ought to be. Then, they may use these external devices 
to guide their actions with the purpose of changing their environments so that they 
approximate the represented ideal situation. The small kid following a Lego blueprint 
seems to be in command of this kind of ability.
What this cursory enumeration suggests is that creatures with robust ought-thoughts are 
not merely aware of the appropriateness/inappropriateness of present responses: they can 
also represent ideal situations that they have not previously experienced, compare what 
is happening with what should happen, think about how to change a current situation so 
that it approximates an ideal one, etc. Then, it seems that, if we are interested in attributing 
robust ought-thoughts to non-human animals, we need to move beyond evidence showing 
that they can give normative responses to particular present behaviors. What we should look 
for, instead, is evidence suggesting that they have general representations about how things 
ought to be, or how agents ought to behave, in different times, contexts, etc. Now, it seems 
likely that animals having such general representations should be able not only to assess their 
current behavior (or that of other creatures) as appropriate or inappropriate, etc., but to have 
normative expectations about how they, or others, must act in the future, how they, or others, 
should have acted in the past, in counterfactual situations, etc. 
But, do we have evidence of the existence of such normative expectations about the past, 
future or counterfactual behaviors? There is no clear answer to this question. There is some 
observational evidence of animals that seem to punish others for things that they have done in 
the past. De Waal (1996), for example, tells the anecdote of two adolescent female chimpanzees 
who one night refused to return to their sleeping quarters at Arnhem Zoo. Now, the rule at 
the zoo was that no chimpanzee would receive food until all of them had entered the building, 
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and hungry chimpanzees usually showed hostility to latecomers. That night, the adolescent 
chimps were given a separate room to prevent reprisals. However, the next morning, the 
whole colony chased them and aggressively bit them, presumably, in reprisal for their past 
behavior. 
Arguably, such a delayed “punishment” cannot be easily explained in terms of a primitive 
normative awareness of the inappropriateness of adolescents’ actions, since they took place in 
the past. At least in principle, it seems easier to explain “delayed punishment” if we credit the 
chimps with a general representation about how everyone ought to enter the building on time 
at night, or something like it, that they can compare with what actually happened, in order to 
conclude that the latecomers behaved badly and have to be punished. One may also attempt 
to explain, along these lines, other evidence of dogs refusing to play with other dogs that have 
“cheated” in the past by being aggressive to them during playful interactions (Bekoff and 
Peirce 2009) and of chimpanzees delayed retaliation after aggressive encounters with others 
(de Waal and Lutrell, 1988). However, the available data is admittedly quite scarce and it is 
possible to think of less demanding ways of explaining it.8 
Another (to my mind more promising) strategy would consist in looking for evidence that 
non-human animals can succeed in the kind of complex tasks mentioned in a)-c) – i.e., 
complex planning, the use of external representations as models or standards, the invention 
of new rules or normative practices, etc. The problem, of course, is that we seem to lack such 
evidence. We have some impressive evidence of long-term planning in the animal kingdom, 
especially in great apes (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath, 2009), corvids (Raby et al., 2007) and 
monkeys (Bourjade et al., 2012). But we still need to examine it carefully and, probably, run 
complementary studies, to establish whether such planning involves not only secondary 
representations but, more specifically, thoughts about how things ought to be or how one 
ought to behave. Similarly, some studies indicate that some chimpanzees can use scale models 
and photographs as sources of information about their referents. They can, for example, 
use the information provided by such external representations to locate hidden objects in a 
room (Kuhlmeier, Boysen & Mukobi, 1999). Yet, this only shows that chimps can use external 
representations as models of how things are. What we would need is evidence that they can 
use external representations as models of how things ought to be.9 This would be the case, 
for example, if these animals could use maps not to find out the actual location of things, but, 
rather, to represent where they should put them in a room.
To sum up, it seems that if we want to credit non-human animals with robust ought-thoughts, 
we need to obtain a kind of evidence that is still scarce or lacking. Discussing the notion and 
comparing it with other ways of understanding animal normativity might be of help, however, to 
guide future empirical research. More generally, it appears that there is also a lot of philosophical 
and scientific work to do in order to establish whether we should attribute any normative 
responsiveness to non-human animals, and how this responsiveness should be understood in 
each case. Here, I have limited myself to sketching two alternative models on how to think about 
animal normativity that need to be further discussed, both theoretically and empirically. 
8 One may think, for example, that when some animals misbehave, they are immediately “marked” or “categorized” 
by others, who find their current behavior “inappropriate”, as animals that one should attack, avoid playing with, 
etc. This categorization is what will cause their negative reactions towards them later on. If this were the case, no 
comparison of their past-behaviors with an independent robust ought-thought would be needed to explain the 
evidence under discussion. 
9 Once again, using something as a model (of an ideal situation) is different from representing it as a model. The 
former involves only a practical capacity to use the information about an ideal situation that the model provides in 
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